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THE CANON AND THE CONSTITUTION 
OUTSIDE THE COURTS 
Sotirios A. Barber* 
James E. Fleming** 
What would it mean for "the canon of constitutional law" if 
we were to take seriously "the Constitution outside the courts"? 
What would happen to the canon if we were to distinguish (as 
Cass Sunstein and Larry Sager do) between the partial, judicially 
enforceable Constitution and the Constitution that imposes 
higher obligations upon legislatures, executives, and citizens 
generally to pursue constitutional ends or to secure constitu-
tional rights? How would the canon be affected by "taking the 
Constitution away from the courts," as Mark Tushnet proposes,2 
or by adopting what Sandy Levinson has called a "Protestant" 
rather than a court-centered "Catholic" approach to the ques-
tion, who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution?3 
We are co-authors, with Walter Murphy, of a casebook, 
American Constitutional Interpretation, which conceives the en-
terprise of constitutional interpretation on the basis of three ba-
sic interrogatives: What is the Constitution? Who may authorita-
tively interpret it? and How ought it to be interpretedt In our 
treatment of the questions What? and Who? and in our selection 
of cases and materials bearing on those questions, we commit 
ourselves to a muscular conception of the Constitution outside 
• Professor of Government, University of Notre Dame. 
•• Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics, 
Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. We are grateful to 
Walter Murphy for comments on a draft of this essay. 
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993); Law-
rence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 
91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflec-
tions on the Thinness ofConstituJional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410,419 (1993). 
2. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton U. 
Press, 1999). 
3. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9-53 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). 
4. Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming and Sotirios A. Barber, American Consti-
tutional Interpretation (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1995). 
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the courts, rather than simply focusing on constitutional inter-
pretation by courts and on constitutional law as the product of 
Supreme Court decisions. In this essay, we briefly explore the 
canon and the Constitution outside the courts in general and 
then in particular with respect to a canonical, though wrongly 
decided, case, DeShaney. We take up the matter of how case-
book authors might show that the canon of the Constitution is 
broader than the canon of the judicially enforceable Constitu-
tion. We raise the issue of DeShaney here, not to say anything 
n.ew on the subject, but instead to put it on the table for discus-
SlOn. 
We appreciate the many difficulties associated with the con-
cern for the Constitution outside the courts. Though the nation 
has not always moved toward a judicial monopoly of constitu-
tional interpretation in all areas of constitutional controversy, 
American constitutional history does exhibit uneven progress 
toward a judicial monopoly of most constitutional questions, in-
cluding most of the weightiest constitutional questions. Even 
where doctrinal change seems largely epiphenomenal on social 
and economic developments that occur "outside the law," the 
formal Constitution does not catch up until the courts say so, and 
the precise constitutional rationalizations of these developments, 
factors in their future, depend also on the courts. 
The judiciary's apparent grip on the Constitution can be 
connected to a founding strategy to facilitate and foster private 
economic pursuits from which the common good would emerge 
as if by some hidden hand. As long as things go well or recovery 
is just around the corner, a bourgeois citizenry is too busy living 
to reflect much on its manner of living. Finding it easiest to be-
lieve that pleasure defines the good, and encouraged to do so by 
the regime, the bourgeois citizenry degrades all other answers to 
"ideology." This entrenches its answer so deeply that it is no 
longer seen as one of several (debatable) answers, and the ques-
tion goes neglected-rationally unanswerable, some come to be-
lieve. This neglect and depreciation of the question creates a 
vacuum into which the courts are sucked by virtue of the way 
constitutional language forces judges into philosophic reflection 
and choice. (Justices finding a constitutional right to abortion, 
for example, had to make and eventually defended assumptions 
about the nature of liberty.5 Opponents of the right, like Justice 
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); P/mmed Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
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Scalia in Casey, predictably raised (second-order) philosophic 
objections to the (first-order) attempt to define liberty.6 Both 
sides thus addressed formidable philosophic issues, even though 
one side pretended not to.) 
But bourgeois life has its attractions, and some of them (sci-
entific progress, the corrosion of racial and ethnic commitments, 
and an aspiration to prosperity for all responsible persons) leave 
social progressives to complain less about regime norms than 
about the gap between regime norms and public attitudes and 
policies. Regime criticism is thus largely abandoned to the parti-
sans of particular truths that are at odds with the bourgeois Con-
stitution, like fundamentalist Christianity and Social Darwinism. 
A Constitution outside the courts thus risks a stronger voice 
for reactionary forces in formulating constitutional doctrine, 
possibly through means like the state-legislative committees of 
correspondence proposed by Madison's Report of 1799 on the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the Southern Manifesto in 
opposition to Brown, and Ronald Reagan's refusal to acknowl-
edge the precedential authority of federal judicial decisions in 
certain disability cases under the Social Security Act. (We in-
clude, or will include, materials concerning all of these in Ameri-
can Constitutional Interpretation.) There is also Madison's 
warning in The Federalist 49 that submissions of constitutional 
questions to the electorate (an agency outside the courts) will 
undermine the Constitution's legitimacy by involving it in parti-
san political clashes. Those who dismiss Madison's assumption 
that constitutional doctrine can ever be other than partisan 
might nevertheless share a Hobbesian fear of the worst conse-
quences of allowing more than one authoritative interpreter of 
our nation's basic law. 
These risks are mitigated by further reflection, however. 
Opt for one interpreter on any ground, Hobbesian or otherwise, 
and that interpreter is, for familiar cultural and institutional rea-
sons, most likely to be the judiciary. Propose a constitution out-
side the courts and you propose multiple interpreters, though a 
practice of multiple interpreters cannot realistically hope for 
much more than improvement of the judicial product on its own 
terms and is likely to leave the judiciary on top in all but those 
few areas the courts call "political." We say this because first-
6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, J.J.). 
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order constitutional discussion in America today is mostly about 
what the "supreme Law" permits or prohibits. Altogether un-
like the ratification debate, and largely dismissive of the Consti-
tution's preamble, today's constitutional discussion has little to 
say about what the Constitution promises by way of substantive 
goods. 
Most constitutional scholars do not even admit substantive 
benefits of the kind delivered through the powers to tax and 
spend as a category of constitutional discourse.7 Left and right, 
constitutional scholars tend to assign such policy questions and 
constitutional questions to mutually exclusive categories. They 
tend to hold that the Constitution guarantees process rights and 
"negative liberties" only, not substantive benefits. Such a view 
treats substantive benefits afforded through the powers to tax 
and spend as constitutionally gratuitous, not fulfillments of con-
stitutional obligations. This view is so firmly established that the 
Supreme Court was able to affirm it in a decision that might 
have been seen as its reductio ad absurdum. The case was De-
Shaney; it held that a state has no constitutional duty to protect a 
four-year old child from the predictable physical harm of a vio-
lent parent-in effect, that a person has no constitutional right 
even to a minimal benefit of the night-watchman state.8 
The DeShaney Court might have said, not that it saw no 
constitutional right, but that it saw no constitutional right that 
was judicially enforceable. But this might have suggested consti-
tutional duties and rights to benefits that are not judicially en-
forceable, constitutional end-states that judges can do little to 
achieve. And this in turn would have implied the need for a con-
stitutionally-minded electorate whose individual members would 
be willing to pay higher taxes in pursuit of a nation whose quali-
ties of life and government could serve as sources of pride. This 
would have been a Constitution truly outside the courts, a non-
justiciable Constitution, a Constitution whose pursuit leaves the 
judiciary little beyond the power to exhort. Precedent for such a 
holding could have been the Court's dismissal of war-powers 
questions as political questions (not to mention other instances 
of judicially underenforced norms analyzed by Larry Sager9). 
7. For an exception, see generally Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental 
Constitution, 42 Am. J. Juris. 159 (1997). 
8. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
9. See Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. (cited in note 1); Sager, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. (cited in 
note 1). 
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When the Court recognizes constitutional questions left to the 
political branches-an appropriate concept when substantive 
benefits (like national security) are involved, benefits pursued 
through the powers to tax (or conscript) and spend-it implicitly 
conceives the Constitution as a charter of benefits and concedes 
a place for concepts like constitutional policies or ends (like na-
tional security) and corresponding constitutional duties, judi-
cially unenforceable though they may be. 
DeShaney's rejection of this approach in domestic politics, 
and the academy's acquiescence in DeShaney,10 suggest that 
much current talk about "the Constitution outside the courts" 
(with some notable exceptions11 ) will be parasitic upon, reactive 
to, or in any case in the shadow of the Constitution inside the 
courts. Put another way, it probably envisions little more than 
an extension of the practice of friends of the court filing amicus 
briefs inside the courts. Consequently, outside opinions about 
constitutional matters that are the subject of litigation will re-
main within the discourse of litigants and judges, a discourse 
which asks not what is good, but what courts will do in fact (to 
evoke Holmes's "bad man" view of the law12), or what is re-
quired by fidelity to what courts have decided in the past. 
Though our reflections here impart ambiguity to the phrase, 
we do favor a Constitution "outside the courts," despite our ap-
preciation of the risks on the one hand and our modest expecta-
tions on the other. One reason is our interest in the survival of 
constitutionalist possibilities, in which we include fresh acts of 
constitution making and reform of the public-spirited sort ideal-
ized in The Federalist. American constitutions are made outside 
the courts, at least initially, and the Constitution of 1789 was 
proposed and ratified as a set of means toward a culturally lim-
ited range of substantive goods that were explicitly held to be 
more important than democracy itself; hence Publius's repeated 
assertions (e.g., in Nos. 9, 10, 40, 45, 63, 71) in behalf of justice 
and the welfare and happiness of the people as the ends of con-
stitutional government and the tests by which popular govern-
ment itself would stand or fall. 
10. Here one might also mention the academy's acceptance of the Court's policies 
regarding standing and advisory opinions, which reject key elements of this outside Con-
st~tution, notably citizens' personal interest in public purposes-"citizenship," if you 
will-and the substantive constitutional goods that could justify exhortation in the Con-
stitution's name. 
11. The notable exceptions include the works mentioned in this essay. 
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897). 
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To cultivate a sense of this outside Constitution in American 
Constitutional Interpretation, we include, or will include, num-
bers of The Federalist, court cases and writings of American 
statesmen and scholars that display different basic conceptions 
of what the Constitution is and who may interpret it, and opin-
ions of jurists and others that expose the influence on litigation 
of the outsider's concern for the ends of government. DeShaney, 
for example, is a clear answer to the question of what the Consti-
tution is and an implicit answer to the question of who may 
authoritatively interpret it. For different answers, readers of our 
next edition will be directed to McCulloch, Federalist 45, Lin-
coln's Message to Congress of July 4, 1861 (along with his First 
Inaugural Address), Roosevelt's 1944 State of the Union Ad-
dress advocating a "second Bill of Rights," and Chief Justice 
Hughes's opinion in Parrish ("the bare cost of living must be 
met"). Each of this last group of statements views the Constitu-
tion in terms of substantive benefits that constitutional govern-
ment is obligated to pursue. Our notes on these readings will 
cite recent works by writers like Larry Sager, Mark Tushnet, 
Mark Graber, Cass Sunstein, and Stephen Holmes, and earlier 
articles by Frank Michelman, Robert Bork, and Susan Bandes. 
Our next edition will explore whether, notwithstanding 
cases such as Dandridge and Rodriguez (forebears of De-
Shaney), the Constitution outside the courts contemplates rights 
to minimal subsistence and education.13 That is, despite the slo-
gans about "negative liberties," the Constitution might impose 
affirmative obligations upon the legislative and executive 
branches of government to provide a social minimum of goods 
and services to meet the basic needs of all citizens. These obliga-
tions might entail rights to minimal subsistence and education, 
even if such obligations and rights are not judicially enforceable 
in the absence of legislative or executive measures. 
We will conclude by sketching some thoughts concerning 
two recent views of the Constitution outside the courts, Cass 
Sunstein's judicial minimalism and Mark Tushnet's populist con-
stitutional law (each of which we plan to discuss in the next edi-
tion of our casebook). Sunstein's development of judicial mini-
malism in his new book, One Case at a Time,14 can be inter-
13. One of us is pursuing such questions in considerably greater detail in other 
work. See Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Constitution (unpublished manuscript on 
file with author). 
14. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme 
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preted, in part, as an answer to his own earlier call (in The Par-
tial Constitutionu) for taking seriously the idea of the Constitu-
tion outside the courts.16 One might think that this call means 
that not just courts, but also legislatures and executives, should 
be fora of principle. As such, it is a valuable corrective to over-
drawn contrasts between courts as the forum of principle and 
legislatures as the battleground of power politics. But for Sun-
stein, who argues that legislatures and executives, rather than 
courts, are the true fora of principle, the slogan "the Constitu-
tion outside the courts" practically has come to mean "get the 
Constitution outside of the courts"! One also might think that 
the call for the Constitution outside the courts promises to liber-
ate constitutional theory from its court-centeredness-whether it 
be the court-centeredness of those who are obsessed with courts 
as vindicators of rights or of those who are obsessed with the in-
stitutionallimits of courts-or, in Mark Graber's term, to "dele-
galize" constitutional theory.17 Yet, ironically, Sunstein's recent 
work may end up shackling constitutional theory to concern for 
institutional limits of courts-thus legalizing it with a vengeance. 
Finally, Tushnet's recent book, Taking the Constitution 
Away from the Courts,18 is the most thoughtful and provocative 
expression of its genre. He offers powerful refutations of argu-
ments for judicial supremacy and judicial exclusivity in constitu-
tional interpretation. And he puts forward an attractive vision 
of populist constitutional law outside the courts, one that rightly 
emphasizes the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble. 
But Tushnet does not establish that taking the Constitution seri-
ously outside the courts requires, in his terms, "taking the Con-
stitution away from the courts." By contrast, we contend for a 
constitutionalism that takes the Constitution to legislatures, ex-
ecutives, and citizens, in order that their deliberations, like those 
of courts, might be framed and guided by constitutional princi-
ples and aspirations. 
Court (Harvard U. Press, 1999). 
15. Sunstein, The Partial Constiturion at 9-10 (cited in note 1). 
16. One of us has criticized Sunstein's notion of "judicial minimalisrn." James E. 
Fleming and Linda C. McOain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 509 
(1997). Here we draw upon that critique. Id. at 546. 
17. See Mark A. Graber, Delegalizing Constiturional Theory, The Good Society 47 
(Fall1996). 
18. Tushnet, Taking the Constiturion Away from the Courts (cited in note 2). One 
of us has developed a fuller critique of Tushnet's book. See James E. Fleming, The Con-
stiturion Outside the Courts, 86 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2000). 
